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The People the North Committee, founded in Townsville in 1962, was true to its name. It
wanted to treble the population of northern Australia in a decade. Putting people before profits,
the committee insisted that Australians had a moral obligation to prolifically populate their
northern lands. Neither the ambition nor the rationale was new. In fact, the People the North
Committee was the last gasp of a grand demographic aspiration that went back more than a
hundred years. Thereafter, through to the present day, proposals for northern development have
prioritised economic over demographic gains: profits before people. This article examines the
ambitions and advocacy of the People the North Committee, setting them in the longer
historical trajectory of the aspiration to people the north. In doing so, it offers a window onto a
neglected facet of the nation-building project in Australia.
The People the North Committee, founded in Townsville in 1962, was true to its name.
It wanted to treble the population of northern Australia in a decade, from the existing
350,000 to 1,000,000 by 1973.1 Peopling the north was not a new ambition. It had been
urged by politicians, journalists, lobbyists and scientists since the nineteenth century.
Throughout that time, northern Australia was commonly dubbed the “empty north”,
dramatising the region’s paucity of people and desperate need for demographic
fulfilment. Land lying idle affronted the moral sensibilities of Australians, who prided
themselves on their pioneering aptitudes and their readiness to render the earth fruitful.
Additionally, it was feared, empty land incited the envy of the less fortunate peoples of
the world.
Like its many predecessors, the People the North Committee (hereafter PTNC) put
population ahead of any other consideration. In evaluating development projects,
PTNC chairman Harry Hopkins declared, the “test must be not exports, not state rights,
but people, people in the North”.2 Population, not profit, was the true criterion of
development, the committee told the Queensland Premier, so:
In this development of the North, and indeed in any single development project, there should be
only one test; this is not the influence on Australia’s foreign exchange, nor votes in this and
bordering areas, or anything else, but whether or not it means settling people in Australia’s North,
for this would be the only answer to the Chinese or the Indonesians.3
That reason for populating the north had been given for over a hundred years: We —
Australians — must people the north, lest others — Asians — do so instead.
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The notion that title to territory depended on occupation and use was widely
accepted in 1960s Australia. In his 1964 best-seller, The Lucky Country, Donald Horne
noted that “it seems morally wrong to Australians [...] that so few people live in the
North and that its resources are largely unused. There is anxiety that Australia will not
really have staked its claim to the ‘continent’ until it does something about the North.”
Horne depicted the empty north as a nagging sore on the national conscience, but one
the public was reluctant to remedy. Overcoming that reluctance was the PTNC’s raison
d’être. Its members would have applauded Horne’s declaration that “‘[t]he development
of the North’ really amounts to creating the second half of the nation”.4 For the PTNC,
peopling the north was Australia’s most urgent project of nation-building.
Little has previously been published on the PTNC. Lyndon Megarrity includes a
short discussion of the committee in his recent book on the politics of northern
development, as I did in my 2016 study “empty North” discourses in Australia.5 Apart
from those, the PTNC has scarcely scored a mention in scholarly histories. Yet the
PTNC had a high public profile in the early to mid-1960s, not just in the north but
throughout Australia. Its media officer, Larry Foley, ensured that the PTNC’s ambitions
featured prominently in newspapers and magazines, on radio and television. Other
factors impelling the north into prominence included: the Labor Party’s leader-to-be,
Gough Whitlam, championing northern development as a national imperative; the
increasing contribution of northern mining to the national economy; the escalating
controversies over attempts at intensive agriculture on the Ord River in the East
Kimberley; and the rising profile of Aboriginal affairs on the national political agenda.
It was in this context, in 1965, that the visiting American political scientist, Louise
Overacker, described “the question of development of the ‘far north’” as the issue at
“the forefront of public discussion” in Australia.6 Yet this question, once so intensely
debated, has since slid from most historians’ gaze.
Insofar as northern Australia gets attention from historians today, it is primarily on
the topic of race. Henry Reynolds, Regina Ganter and Julia Martínez, among others,
have shown how north Australia’s multi-ethnic makeup engendered a society distinct
from that of the south.7 Warwick Anderson and David Walker have scrutinised the
multi-faceted efforts to secure the north for the white race.8 There are also some
excellent histories of particular parts of the north, especially the Northern Territory.9
But apart from the work of the two historians named in the preceding paragraph, little
has been written on the imperative to develop and populate the north. Sarah Irving has
published an insightful article on the intellectual traditions that underpinned the
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northern development agenda, and Libby Robin has written on attempts to conscript
science to the conquest of the north.10 However, these studies have little to say about
how campaigns to people the north were conducted, or how those campaigns fitted with
contemporary controversies and preoccupations. Those issues are canvassed here.
This article examines the ambitions and advocacy of the PTNC, setting them in the
longer historical trajectory of the aspiration to people the north. In doing so, it offers a
window onto a neglected facet of the nation-building project in Australia. The PTNC did
more than merely lobby for demographic growth in remote parts of Australia. It advanced
particular conceptions of the nation and international affairs, of the proper relationship
between people and resources, and of moral conduct in a world facing a crisis of over-
population. Like previous generations of Australian population boosters, the PTNC tried to
negotiate the dilemma that while Australia’s supposed population problem was deficiency,
the world’s problem was ever-burgeoning excess. Its proposed resolutions illuminate some
important aspects of Australia on the cusp of the crucial changes of the 1960s.
Unbalanced Nation
The PTNC was set up as a committee of the North Queensland Local Government
Association by the president of that association, Townsville alderman Harry Hopkins. Its
members were aldermen from councils around north-east Queensland, but its ambitions
were not confined to that small patch of the north. The PTNC embraced the entirety of
northern Australia, from Cape York to the Pilbara. Most members were businessmen or
primary producers, whose natural political sympathies would have lain with the Liberal-
Country Party coalition then in government under Prime Minister Robert Menzies. But
Menzies had dragged his feet on developing the north, allowing the Labor opposition to
seize the initiative. Labor’s rising star of the 1960s, Gough Whitlam, made the most of
the opportunity, successfully projecting himself as the north’s staunchest advocate.11
Regardless of the political allegiances of its members, the PTNC accorded with Labor
on questions of northern development. Rejecting the Liberal mantra that economic
development should be left, as much as possible, to the private sector, the PTNC insisted
that massive government funding and meticulous government planning were needed if
the north were to be properly peopled. To this end, it advocated the immediate creation
of a Northern Development Commission, which, having “laid the foundations for the
orderly development of the north”, would be transformed into a permanent Northern
Development Authority.12 Strongly supporting government intervention in the economy,
the PTNC argued that the north would not grow of its own accord since both capital and
people would follow the well-worn path into the south-east corner “unless a deliberate
and sustained effort is made to divert part of the flow into hitherto-neglected areas”.
Existing trends were leading to a grossly imbalanced population distribution which could
be countered only by federal funding and federal planning.13
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Following long established precedent among northern population boosters, the
PTNC maintained that it was inherently wrong for people to concentrate in particular
parts of the continent. The committee insisted that “if Australia is to have any moral
right to hold on to this [northern] part of the country the ludicrous imbalance of
population must be redressed rapidly”.14 Operation Elbow Room, a propaganda booklet
by PTNC media officer Larry Foley, warned of the dangers facing a nation that was
“growing lopsided”. Foley expressed strong misgivings about the Australian people’s
hold over the continent, and equal unease over other nations’ perceptions of Australia’s
poor performance in filling its empty lands. “Occupation of a country is like justice”,
he declared, “which must not only be done, but must be seen to be done”. His booklet
brims with moral and political injunctions that echo back to the early years of the
twentieth century, asserting, for example, that unless the north were prolifically
peopled, an international statesman might “point an accusing finger at Australia and
denounce her as a dog in the manger”.15 It exactly replicated the rhetoric of the
interwar years.16
There had always been commentators who argued the opposing line: that an uneven
population distribution was a normal and natural consequence of the uneven
distribution of resources. Exponents of this view contended that the population of the
north would remain sparse since most of the region was poorly endowed with amenities
such as water and arable land. The geographer, Thomas Griffith Taylor, was the most
famous — and most pugnacious — purveyor of this view in the interwar period, but
there were numerous others who, like him, insisted that Australians had to accept the
demographic limits of the northern portion of the continent.17 The argument was still
bubbling along decades later. In 1962, the year of the PTNC’s creation, W.D. Borrie,
Professor of Demography at the Australian National University, argued that Australia’s
existing demographic pattern would persist into the foreseeable future and most of the
north was unlikely to experience major population growth. Australians should accept
the clustering of people in the southern cities as a demographic fact, he stated, rather
than fighting against it as if there were something unnatural about population
concentrations in particular areas.18
Some experts argued to the contrary. The eminent economist, Sir Douglas Copland,
chaired a body called the National Council for Balanced Development, whose name
accurately stated its objectives. While the council’s concerns were broadly economic
rather than narrowly demographic, it had close connections and overlapping interests
with the PTNC. Like the latter body, Copland argued that in view of the burgeoning
populations in neighbouring Asian countries, we must “promote settlement on a
vigorous plan [in] Northern Australia”.19 Like the PTNC too, Copland explained that
northern development was necessitated not by profit-seeking but by political and moral
obligations: “It is not merely a matter of developing effectively the resources of the
14 “Hopes running high north of Capricorn”.
15 Larry Foley, Operation Elbow Room, PTNC booklet, 1964, PTNC papers, box 4, JCULA.
16 Russell McGregor, “A Dog in the Manger: White Australia and its vast empty spaces”, Australian
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Development, Wagga Wagga, 13-16 November 1962, PTNC papers, box 5, JCULA.
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Northern area of the continent, but of demonstrating to the world, and particularly to
our populous neighbours to the North, that Australia is fully aware of its obligation to
develop the North, and is determined to utilise all the resources at its disposal for this
purpose”.20
Among the speakers at the 1962 Conference on Balanced Development at Wagga
Wagga was the leader of the federal parliamentary Labor Party and populariser of the
slogan “populate or perish”, Arthur Calwell. He stated that half of Edmund Barton’s
ambition of 1901 had been achieved, since “in the political sense we have a nation for
the continent”:
But we have not yet won the continent for the nation. By no means can it be said that we truly
inhabit this continent, when well over a third of our people live in two southern cities, when two-
thirds of our people live in six capital cities, and when forty per cent of the continent is ‘occupied’
by four per cent of our people; it is barely peopled at all [...].
We cannot be truly self-reliant as long as we have the bulk of our population, as it were, clinging
to the cliff face of small sections of our eastern and southern coastlines. We cannot be said to be
self-reliant when two-fifths of our territory, some of it the richest we possess, and among the
richest possessed by any nation, lies virtually empty.21
It was a nice statement of the nationalist abhorrence of demographic disparities within
the national territory.
Labor had no monopoly on devotees to the balanced development doctrine.
“Balanced development is an article of faith in Western Australia”, that state’s
Liberal Minister for Industrial Development and later Premier, Charles Court,
proclaimed. He added: “I emphasise the word ‘faith’ because our justifications for
it are as much a matter of deep intuition as of logic”.22 Only by filling the empty
spaces could Australians “justify our possession of this rich continent” and at the
same time “assuage the desires of other peoples by helping to fill their basic
needs”. Court maintained that balanced development and peopling the north were
essential not only for economic and political reasons but also to fortify our sense
of belonging to Australia, “our homeland”. While lauding the mining ventures
recently opened in the Pilbara, he wanted to see more emphasis on closer
settlement and family farms, for which he invested high hopes in the agricultural
enterprises then being launched in the Ord and Fitzroy valleys in the Kimberleys.
In Court’s summation: “Balanced development is necessary for defence [...] it is
necessary for economic strength [...] it is necessary for personal satisfaction”.23
At its most extreme, the balanced development dogma called for an even spread of
people and enterprises across the entire continent. In the 1920s and 1930s, some
enthusiasts had demanded as much, but by the 1960s ambitions had moderated to some
extent, in recognition of environmental, economic and societal constraints. Compared
with the interwar boosters, the PTNC’s demographic projections were restrained. Larry
Foley explained that
20 D. Copland to H. Hopkins, 23 May 1963, PTNC papers, box 2, JCULA.
21 Arthur Calwell, “The Need for a National Policy so that Australia will be fully occupied by
Australians”, paper presented to the Conference on Balanced Development, Wagga Wagga, 13-16
November 1962, PTNC papers, box 5, JCULA.
22 Court, quoted in Souter, “Two-sided problem of balanced development”.
23 C.W.M. Court, “Balanced Development is a National Priority”, paper delivered to either the 1962
or 1964 conference of the National Council for Balanced Development, PTNC papers, box 5 [ellipses
in original], JCULA.
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the Committee is not saying the North should be filled, immediately, with people. What it
maintains is that one million would be enough to furnish living proof of possession, and show that
this is our land, from east to west, top to bottom, and that we have faith in its future.24
What the PTNC imagined as a desirable ultimate population in the north is unclear,
although it seems to have accepted that attaining demographic parity with the south
was a goal for the distant future.
Nonetheless, some members proposed prodigious population increases.
W.G. Walkley, chairman of the Sydney branch of the PTNC and former managing
director of Ampol Petroleum Ltd, approved the projection of Sir William Hudson
(another interstate ally of the PTNC and Commissioner of the Snowy Mountains
Authority) for a northern population of three million.25 However, Walkley seems to
have considered this just a beginning, since he proposed an Australia-wide population
of 150 million, a figure obtained by extrapolating the population density of the United
Kingdom onto the land area of Australia, then halving it so as not to appear too
sanguine. Perhaps Walkley was idiosyncratic in being more firmly in the interwar
booster tradition than other members of the PTNC. Talking up the agricultural potential
of Mary Kathleen, he stated: “If ever there was a Garden of Eden, Mary Kathleen is
one”.26 Mary Kathleen is the site of an abandoned uranium mine in the arid lands
between Mt Isa and Cloncurry.
Puffery like Walkley’s aside, the PTNC inevitably claimed the north as a resource-
rich land. It had to be, to sustain a prolific population. “Contrary to the belief of many”,
Harry Hopkins told an Apex Club convention, “tropical Australia is not a poor country;
indeed it is exceedingly rich.” The problem was that its riches were not recognised.27
Larry Foley told the same Apex audience that the north was exceptionally well
endowed with Australia’s “rarest and most precious commodity”, water, but the north’s
plenty was merely “running to waste in the sea”. “By ignoring the North, by refusing to
try to save this water, our life’s blood, we are inviting national stagnation.”28 This
image of life-giving water running to waste in the sea was a common trope of northern
development advocates. PTNC allies Sir William Hudson and C.H. Munro, Professor
of Civil Engineering at the University of New South Wales, harnessed that imagery in
their advocacy of massive engineering projects to conserve the wet-season run-off of
the north.29 As their example illustrates, the PTNC extolled not only the natural
attributes of the north but also the capacity of modern technology to transform the
environment according to human desires.
Dangerously Rich and Dangerously Empty
In April 1963 a delegation of the People the North Committee impressed upon the
Queensland Premier the urgency of their objectives. Since the Second World War, they
explained, three crucial changes had occurred: “fabulous mineral discoveries” had been
24 Foley, Operation Elbow Room.
25 W.G. Walkley, chairman’s comments, North Australia Development, p.205.
26 W.G. Walkley, “Northern Development”, Address to the Australian Institute of Management,
18 October 1965, PTNC papers, box 5, JCULA.
27 H. Hopkins, “The Need to Develop the North”, Address to the 30th Annual Convention of the
Association of Apex Clubs, Easter, 1964, PTNC papers, box 5, JCULA.
28 Larry Foley, Address to the 30th Annual Convention of the Association of Apex Clubs, Canberra,
27 March 1964, PTNC papers, box 5, JCULA.
29 See for example W. Hudson, Luncheon Address to National Council for Balanced Development,
15 July 1965, PTNC papers, box 5, JCULA.
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made in the north; the political and military supremacy of the West had diminished;
and Southeast Asian countries had become independent and often aggressive. “All this
means”, the PTNC delegation declared, “that Northern Australia is dangerously rich
and dangerously empty.”30 Those words — “dangerously rich and dangerously empty”
— became a favourite phrase among members of the PTNC, as well as sympathetic
outsiders such as Charles Court.31 And there was never any doubt about where the
danger lay.
The threat of Asia had always held many dimensions — military, moral, political,
economic, demographic — and the stress laid on each shifted over time. In the 1960s,
the perceived military threat was receding, while moral and political misgivings loomed
larger than ever. Especially toward the end of the decade, Australia was pushed into an
intensifying engagement — or “enmeshment” in the terminology of the day — with
Asia, and increasing emphasis was placed on the opportunities thereby offered.32 Those
shifts were hesitant, often faltering, and as the career of the PTNC attests, a perception
of Asia as threat persisted even as the nature of the threat was transformed.
After separately interviewing Harry Hopkins, journalists Margaret Jones and Ward
McNally both reported that the PTNC chairman was “obsessed with the threat of Asian
countries to the north of Australia, swollen and over-ripe with population”. Both
recorded him saying: “If we don’t people the North, someone else is going to do the
job for us”. However, they noted that Hopkins did not see the threat of Asia as
primarily military. According to Jones, he explicitly stated that “you don’t have to have
shooting wars any more to take possession of a country”. Hopkins envisaged a scenario
whereby an Asian country became strong enough to impress its wishes on world
opinion. “Along comes the United Nations and says Australia’s empty spaces are
morally indefensible, and constitute a danger to world peace. We should admit Asians,
or else, they will tell us.”33 A United Nations’ abrogation of Australia’s sovereignty
sounds highly implausible, but Hopkins was not the only peddler of this prospect at the
time. Moreover, it recapitulated interwar fears of the League of Nations forcing
Australia’s hand if it continued to leave its north empty while barring Asian
immigrants.34
As Hopkins’ words indicate, he and his committee were devotees of the White
Australia policy. Excluding Asians and filling the north with white people were to them
alternate sides of the same coin. “We have the chance to build a white, Western
civilisation right from the ground up”, Hopkins enthused, but the opportunity would be
forfeited unless the north were fortified with white people.35 Members of the PTNC
seem to have accepted the premises of a white Australia as a matter of common sense.
They seldom explicitly discussed the policy, but their advocacy was steeped in its
assumptions. “The northern third of Australia [...] will one day hold millions of
30 Deputation to the Premier of Queensland, 1 April 1963.
31 “Dangerously Rich, Empty”, Courier Mail, 8 July 1963, PTNC papers, box 4.
32 David Goldsworthy, David Dutton, Peter Gifford and Roderick Pitty, “Reorientation”, in Facing
North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia, Vol.1 (Melbourne, 2001), pp.310-371;
McGregor, Environment, Race, and Nationhood, ch.11; David Walker, “Australia’s Asian Futures”, in
Martyn Lyons and Penny Russell, eds, Australia’s History: Themes and disputes (Sydney, 2005),
pp.63-80.
33 Margaret Jones, “Vision of Empire in Capricornia”, Sun-Herald, 25 November 1962, PTNC, box
4; Ward McNally, Australia: The Challenging Land (London, 1965), pp.76-77.
34 McGregor, “Dog in the Manger”.
35 Jones, “Vision of Empire”.
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people”, a PTNC pamphlet prophesied. “But will those people be Australians?”36
Logically, if they lived in Australia, of course they would be “Australians”. But the
PTNC construed that word much more narrowly.
The term “population explosion” dates from the 1950s, although the idea can be
traced back to Thomas Malthus’s writings in the eighteenth century. By the 1960s, the
“population explosion” had spawned an array of forecasts of demographically-induced
disaster, summed up in Paul Ehrlich’s 1968 book, The Population Bomb. Many
responded through movements such as Zero Population Growth. But not the PTNC. Its
propaganda frequently referred to the “population explosion”, but as a warning of the
threat to Australia’s empty northern lands and the consequent need to people them.
According to Larry Foley, the “population explosion” was widely misunderstood,
partly because the term was somewhat misleading:
It is not an explosion so much as a tide that is simply going to rise, and rise, apparently without
ever turning. Because it is a barely perceptible process, and something new, nobody is making
adequate preparations for it. Few are raising the alarm. But as in all floods, soon there will be a
panic struggle for the high, dry grounds. Like Australia. When the new millions face starvation,
why should they not ask whether our great empty spaces could support them?37
While the PTNC freely used the new term “population explosion”, its extrapolations
from it were the hackneyed political and moral injunctions against land lying idle:
in the light of the population explosion and the resultant pressure on the world’s capacity to feed
the hungry, Australia is under a moral obligation to make full use of her land.
What answer will Australia give if one day a demand is made through the United Nations that
unused but potentially productive areas be turned over, in the name of humanity, to larger powers
– under United Nations auspices – which will use them?
What if Australia is told: ‘Your continent is obviously too big for you to develop alone?’
Would we have the right to deny its use to others in need?
The question of taking our lands by force need never arise.
The real threat to Australia’s future may prove to be not a nuclear bomb in a dictator’s hands but a
hungry baby in an Asian mother’s arms.38
Alert to its emotional impact, the PTNC recycled the hungry baby image many
times over.
Occasionally, the PTNC raised the spectre of military invasion, but its usual scare
scenario was Australia being forced by the international community to either cede
territory or admit Asian immigrants en masse. These were common projections among
northern development advocates at the time. Yet some still proffered an apocalyptic
vision of military invasion. In 1967 the Country Party member for the north
Queensland seat of Kennedy, Bob Katter senior, warned that the Chinese looked on our
“great empty north” with envy, and on the Australian people with “vicious, animal
hatred”. Inevitably, when the Chinese population exploded, “[w]e who live in the
northern part of Australia would suffer the initial onslaught of an invasion that would
be like Armageddon”.39 Though not averse to scare-mongering, the PTNC avoided
such over-dramatisations. They would have detracted from its campaign to attract
people to the north.
36 People the North! An urgent message.
37 Foley, “Address to the 30th Annual Convention of Apex Clubs”.
38 People the North! An Urgent Message.
39 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates (CPD), House, 23 August 1967, p.353.
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Normalising the North
The PTNC did not support development at any cost. It wanted the north to be a home
where people could build happy lives, not a mere quarry open for exploitation. “For too
long”, Larry Foley lamented, “the North has been looked on as a place to plunder, not
to populate”, a place to which people came “to make money, but not a home; to dig
something up, push or pull something down, catch something, kill something. Then
back they go to where they came from, leaving behind gaps and scars in the landscape,
holes in the ground and a depleted fauna.”40 That attitude and those actions, the PTNC
insisted, had to stop.
Consequently, while members of the PTNC welcomed the north’s mining boom, they
had grave misgivings about how the mining industry carried out its business. The
prevailing practice of trucking minerals to the nearest port and sending them south for
processing was squandering opportunities to build industries and cities in the north.
The PTNC wanted the minerals to be processed on site, to form centres of industry and
thereby nuclei for population growth. As Harry Hopkins explained in 1962, the PTNC
aimed to ensure “that where there are lodes in the North, there must be steel cities,
aluminium cities, and so forth, not just loading ramps, gantreys and a few bulldozer
drivers”.41 In the PTNC’s view, Australians were too ready to enjoy the wealth
generated by the north’s minerals, and too reluctant to ensure that the associated
industries contributed to a more even population distribution.42
The PTNC’s espousal of urbanisation and industrialisation was at odds with
mainstream populate-the-north advocacy before the Second World War. Then, the
emphasis had been squarely on agriculture, and the ideal northern settler had been
conceived in the yeoman farmer mould.43 Harry Hopkins rejected what he called a
“nineteenth century” model of agrarian settlement and gave farming no priority over
other economic enterprises.44 The PTNC vision was of a north studded with cities, the
land transformed by science and engineering, the economy driven by factories, mines
and machines.
In line with its advocacy of urbanisation and technology, the PTNC was among the
keenest promoters of a new tropical university. The University of Queensland had
founded a college in Townsville in 1961, and when a major expansion got underway
three years later, Larry Foley waxed lyrical about the prospects for “Australia’s first
tropical university”. He and fellow northern enthusiasts were sure the college would
soon become an autonomous university: “a meeting place of pioneering minds devoted
to the world’s tropical belt, where East meets West, where formidable problems of over-
population, of alternate floods and droughts, of famine and plague, demand solutions”.
Increasingly by the 1960s, white Australia supporters were recognising that Australia
had to reach out to its region through aid and exchange programs. As Foley explained:
“Many newly independent nations in Africa and Asia face developmental problems
similar to those posed by Australia’s empty North, which Townsville as an Australian
tropical centre of learning will help solve”. He specified, too, that while the new
40 Foley, Operation Elbow Room.
41 Hopkins, “People the North”. See also L Foley, “PTN – the story so far”, 25 January 1965, PTNC
papers, box 4, JCULA.
42 PTNC, “Submission made to the joint government mining and national development committees at
Townsville, 27 July 1968”, PTNC papers, box 3, JCULA.
43 McGregor, Environment, Race, and Nationhood.
44 Hopkins, “Planning Northern Development”, pp.81-82.
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university should offer the usual complement of subjects taught at Australian
universities, it “should differ markedly in its specialities related to the East”.45
The PTNC did not regard the university as either an ivory tower or a mere technical
adjunct to development. It saw a northern university as a manifestation of the cultural
maturity of the north. A press release by Larry Foley, on the occasion of the turning of
the first sod at a new campus in Townsville on 7 November 1964, devoted as much
space to the aesthetics and architecture of the university-to-be as to its academic
credentials. Foley lovingly described how the campus would be fashioned as a “great
park”, aligned to take advantage of vistas of the major natural landforms of Townsville,
Castle Hill and Mount Stuart, while its buildings would incorporate local stone and
copper to “blend beautifully with the natural background and vegetation”. The new
university would “form a harmonious whole throughout all stages of its growth over
the coming centuries. Yes, centuries”, he enthused, adding an endorsement of the
university planners’ comparison of their institution’s projected growth with that of
Oxford, Cambridge, Harvard and Yale.46 The PTNC wanted an educated and urbane
north.
Whereas its pre-war precursors had deplored the devitalising impact of urbanisation,
the PTNC lauded the comforts of the city and enthusiastically embraced suburbia.
Denying that the north was “a land of extremes and hardships”, it tried to convince the
“townie or city-dweller, who has a steady, routine nine-to-five job, a house in the
suburbs, cuts the grass in front of his house and cleans his car on Sunday” that his
comfortable lifestyle could be replicated in the north. Developing the north was “not a
question of calling for pioneers”, the PTNC declared; “Australians will not pioneer
today as their forefathers did; they do not have to [...]. They are born, live and die in an
affluent society.” Consequently, what the north needed were the facilities that would
enable families to enjoy a suburban lifestyle. That lifestyle in the north would be better
than in the south, the PTNC averred, with more space, fresher air, less bustle and fewer
juvenile delinquents.47 This may have been a manifestation of the triumph of suburbia
in 1960s Australian popular culture, but it dovetailed with the PTNC’s campaign to
normalise the north.
It was a sign of changing priorities, too, that the PTNC adopted a conservationist
stance, albeit a moderate one. Among the biggest environmental campaigns in
Australia in the 1960s was saving the Great Barrier Reef from mining and drilling for
natural gas.48 The PTNC recommended against mining, at least until comprehensive
scientific studies had been undertaken. It was “Australia’s duty to ensure that the Great
Barrier Reef is preserved for posterity and not allowed to be endangered by short term
and immediate monetary gain”, the committee advised, adding that it was probable that
the reef’s “immense value as a tourist attraction will far outweigh in monetary gain the
once only harvest from mineral extraction”.49 This combination of conservationist
45 L. Foley, “Australia’s first tropical university”, 7 November 1964, PTNC papers, box 4, JCULA.
46 Foley, “Australia’s first tropical university”.
47 Foley, Operation Elbow Room.
48 Rohan Lloyd, Maxine Newlands and Theresa Petray, “Coral Battleground: Re-examining the ‘Save
the Reef’ campaign in 1960s Australia”, Environmental Sociology, Vol.3, 1 (2017), pp.54-63; Drew
Hutton and Libby Connors, A History of the Australian Environment Movement (Cambridge, 1999),
pp.99-106.
49 PTNC “Submission made to the Senate Select Committee on Off-shore Petroleum Resources, on
14 February, 1969”, PTNC papers, box 4. See also PTNC “Submission made to the joint government
mining and national development committees 1968”, JCULA.
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idealism and economic pragmatism was commonplace in contemporary appeals to save
the reef.
At times, the PTNC asserted a stronger conservationist line. It quoted with approval
ecologist Len Webb’s statement regarding the north Queensland rainforests, that the
“aesthetic and spiritual reasons for conservation are self-evident”. It quoted with even
greater approval a declaration by the prominent conservationist and co-founder of the
Save the Reef campaign, John Busst:
Hell, chum, we’re not standing in the way of progress. Far from it. We all want the North
developed.
But let’s do it without trampling the whole bloody paradise underfoot!
Let’s tread carefully. Bulldozers don’t!50
It bears noting that insofar as the PTNC advanced a conservationist line, it was for the
two iconic environments of north Queensland: reef and rainforest. In any event, its
moderate conservationism and development-within-limits ethos were consistent with
the PTNC’s desire to make the north a home for Australian families, not just a patch of
dirt from which to scratch a profit.
Despite its emphasis on population, and the fact that the 1960s was a time of
massive immigrant flows into Australia, the PTNC had no particular interest in
channelling immigrants northwards. On the relatively few occasions it raised the issue
of overseas immigration, the PTNC was careful to specify that while it welcomed
immigrants, it did “not advocate a special immigration policy to attract people to
northern Australia”.51 “I am not an advocate of special immigration for the
development of the North”, Harry Hopkins declared, though he added that
governments could make a better effort “to publicise North Australia overseas.”52 The
PTNC seems to have envisaged the north being populated primarily by people from
southern Australia moving northward to enjoy the benefits on offer, with overseas
immigrants only minor contributors to the process.
While immigrants were marginal to the PTNC’s concerns, Aboriginal people were
virtually absent. This may seem unsurprising to readers today, but in fact Aborigines
had been an enduring presence in writings about northern Australia, and by the 1960s
some exponents of northern development were including Indigenous interests in their
advocacy. J.H. Kelly, a former member of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, even
titled one of his booklets Human Rights for Aborigines: Pre-requisite for Northern
Development.53 Yet in the prolific propaganda of the PTNC, the only mention of
Aboriginal people I have found is in Operation Elbow Room, where Larry Foley
instanced them as one of many peoples who have forfeited their lands, thereby
exemplifying the fate modern Australians must resolutely avoid.54 Using the story of
Aboriginal dispossession in this way — as a reminder of what would befall those who
failed to properly people their country — had been a stock-in-trade of population
boosters for more than a century.
50 “Hope for Mankind in North’s Rain Forests”, PTNC press release, 14 November 1965, PTNC
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People or Profits?
The drive to people the north had never been primarily about making money. Capitalist
though Australia was, some things transcended the profit motive. Nation-building was
one of them. The PTNC was firmly within this tradition, insisting that peopling the
north was a national priority to which all other developmental objectives, including
economic gain, must be subservient. Many other northern development advocates
agreed. Speaking at a PTNC conference in 1964, Rex Patterson, Director of the
Northern Division of the Department of National Development, affirmed that
development should aim at establishing “a permanent and growing population”.
Rejecting the idea that projects should be evaluated “in terms of strict economics”, he
wanted funds to be invested in “that type of development, such as intensive agriculture
or processing, which will not only constitute a stable nucleus, but will result also in a
rapid growth of population to service the continuing and self-generating demand which
is created”. The primary objective of northern development, he insisted, was not to
generate profits, but to put people permanently in the north.55
But by the 1960s some advocates of northern development — even some allies of
the PTNC — were playing down the population objective. R.H. Greenwood, Professor
of Geography at the University of Queensland, had participated in the 1962 meeting at
which the PTNC was conceived, but he rejected the ambition that gave the committee
its name. While he strongly urged the economic development of the north, and
recognised that this would attract people to the region, Greenwood disavowed
population growth as a deliberate objective of policy. Rather, the north should be
developed to diversify the national economy.56 Fellow geographer J. MacDonald
Holmes, Emeritus Professor at the University of Sydney, similarly demoted the
objective of population growth:
Great empty spaces are not a handicap, but a challenge to producers of large-scale commercial
enterprises on the land, whereby men and machines and modern technology will maintain the
empty space, empty of people but full of production so that it discounts the world over-population
bomb which bids fair, should it burst, to have even more disastrous consequences to the world than
the much publicized atom or hydrogen bomb.57
Holmes was an advocate of northern development, but he had abandoned the equation
of development with demographic intensification. His views were on the ascendant in
the 1960s.
Some experts not only discounted the demand to populate but also assailed the
whole drive to develop the north. Half-way through the PTNC’s short career,
agricultural economist Bruce Davidson published a withering blast against what he
called “the northern myth”. There had always been critics of grand schemes for
northern development. In the past, most had based their critiques on environmental
grounds, particularly the north’s shortages of accessible water and arable land.
Davidson took a different tack. He acknowledged the environmental impediments to
northern development — his book essentially took them for granted — but he
55 R. Patterson, “Establishing a Permanent Population in Northern Australia”, paper presented to the
Conference of People the North Committee, Townsville, 18 October 1964, National Archives of
Australia, Darwin, NTAC 1980/26 1973/931.
56 R.H. Greenwood, “The Strategy for Northern Development” in North Australia Development,
pp.116-117; R.H. Greenwood to H.H. Hopkins, 24 May 1963, PTNC papers, box 4, JCULA.
57 J. MacDonald Holmes, Australia’s Open North: A study of Northern Australia bearing on the
urgency of the times (Sydney, 1963), p.450.
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formulated his arguments along rigorously economic lines. On the premise that
“development is an economic process”, he insisted that assessments for developmental
purposes must adhere to a systematic set of questions concerning products, yields,
costs, prices and competition, and should never become entangled in social, political or
moral questions.
Although Davidson’s book was primarily a quantitative study of the economics of
northern development, he devoted one chapter to critiquing its “non-economic”
motivations. The first of these was the notion that unless the north were occupied by
Australians, it would be occupied by someone else; the second was the need for
military defence. According to Davidson, these were founded on misunderstandings of
international affairs, and, like all “non-economic” motives for northern development,
should be summarily dismissed.58 His rebuttals of these motives were in no way
original; all had been proffered by numerous critics on numerous occasions over the
preceding six decades. Where Davidson was original was in the rigour with which he
built up an economic case against the investment of money and resources in special
projects to develop the north.
For the asperity of his economic analyses, plus the stridency of his attacks on
northern development projects, Davidson earned both acclamation and condemnation.
The Northern Myth was among the most vigorously debated books of the mid-1960s,
with argument, pro and con, appearing in a wide array of newspapers, magazines, radio
and television programs. It gave the north a lot of publicity, though not necessarily of
the kind the PTNC wanted. Among the committee’s many rejoinders to Davidson was a
lampoon by Larry Foley, featuring a book titled “The Southern Myth” being debated
by a northern Cabinet located in an imaginary Australia whose colonisation had begun,
sensibly, in the tropics.59 Like most of the PTNC’s ripostes, it failed to confront the
hard-headed analyses of The Northern Myth. Despite its opposition to Davidson’s
stance, however, when the PTNC hosted a major symposium in Sydney on 14-15
February 1966, it invited Davidson to participate as a speaker. Perhaps the PTNC was
committed to fairness and balance. Or perhaps its members were over-confident of the
cogency of their own arguments.
In fact, the tide of opinion was turning Davidson’s way. In an appreciative review of
The Northern Myth, economist Alan Lloyd stated:
It is only a slight exaggeration to say that Davidson’s book and the interest it has aroused symbolize a
new era. The transition has been gradual, but it is clear. Until recent decades decisions on
government-financed development schemes, such as irrigation projects and the opening up of new
areas, were made largely on the basis of technical factors, flavoured by amateur economics
(as propounded by engineers, accountants, and agricultural scientists) and a leavening of parish pump
politics (many a dam is a memorial to a swinging seat of the past). Nowadays, properly calculated
benefit-cost ratios and returns on invested capital are at least considered and are sometimes decisive.
Lloyd discerned a hardening division of commentators “into two permanent camps —
pro and anti northern development”, with economic criteria increasingly at the centre of
contention.60 In this context, with economics gaining ascendancy, the PTNC’s
conventional focus on demographics was being pushed to the margins.
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Other social and cultural shifts pushed in the same direction, so that by the latter part
of the 1960s the PTNC’s aspirations and arguments no longer gripped the national
imagination. After Prime Minister Harold Holt’s reforms of 1966, the long, slow
demise of the White Australia policy picked up pace.61 While perceptions of Asia as a
threat persisted, emphasis shifted toward the opportunities Asia offered. A nascent
environmental movement was changing attitudes toward land and resources,
undercutting older ideas of a moral imperative to put resources to use. Recognition of
Aboriginal people and Aboriginal interests were on the rise too, and with these the
notion that the north was in some sense “empty” was losing credibility.62 There was no
sudden change of heart among the Australian people, but the ambition to people the
north was steadily deflating.
After a change of chairman in mid-1967, the PTNC decided to change its horizons
as well. Abandoning the broad sweep of northern Australia, henceforward it would
lobby exclusively for the area covered by the North Queensland Local Government
Association, that is, north-east Queensland. New chairman Mick Borzi justified the
narrowing of vision by claiming that “the Committee’s vigorous campaign had been
successful in arousing interest throughout Australia of the imperative need for
development of the North”.63 Perhaps this was not entirely delusional. Through its
media campaigns, the committee had stimulated public interest in the northern cause.
However, the grand ambitions proclaimed by the PTNC on its inauguration five years
earlier had certainly not been met. They had scarcely advanced a step.
By slicing off the greater part of its initial area of concern, the PTNC did more than
merely change focus. The contraction of interest to north-east Queensland meant that a
body set up to promote population growth in the north would now limit itself to the one
place in the north that already had a substantial and rapidly-growing population. The
ineptness of this was not pointed out at the time, but the PTNC had clearly lost its
compass. After stumbling along ineffectually for almost two years, the committee
quietly expired in May 1969. No one mourned its passing and no comparable lobby
group was set up in its place.
Conclusion
The PTNC was a very Townsville-centric body. Most of the active membership lived in
that city, and those who did not still lived on the east coastal strip of north Queensland.
They tended to see the potential of the north in the familiar terms of their own region.
Indeed, it would be only a slight exaggeration to say that they sought to remake the
entirety of northern Australia in the image of north-coastal Queensland. That part of
the north already had a primarily urban populace and well-established secondary
industries. Those elements of the PTNC agenda which were relatively novel among
promoters of northern development — the encouragement of urbanisation and
industrialisation — were rooted in local realities. The PTNC wanted to create an urbane
society in the north, and this, more than any other factor, distinguishes it from earlier
lobbyists for a populous north.
Apart from urbanisation and industrialisation, the other components of the PTNC’s
agenda, its rationales and rationalisations, were well-established, even clichéd. By the
late 1960s, those conventional rationales for filling the empty north — affirming moral
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title to territory, shoring up defences and preserving white Australia — had waned in
public credibility and consequence. When the PTNC fizzled out in 1969, its ambition
of boosting the northern population was no longer an issue of urgent public concern.
The PTNC was the last gasp of a grand demographic aspiration that had prevailed for a
hundred years. It was not that proposals for northern development came to an end.
They continued. But by the beginning of the 1970s, boosting the population was no
longer front and centre of those proposals. Financial profit eclipsed demographic gain.
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